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THE VIRTUE OF OBEDIENCE 
Phili P L. Quinn 
This paper is a critical study of Christians among the Virtues: Theological 
Conversations with Ancient and Modern Ethics by Stanley Hauerwas and Charles 
Pinches. It has four parts. First, I consider several possible responses to G. E. 
M. Anscombe's famous challenge to modern moral philosophy in order to pro-
vide a framework in which the project of Hauerwas and Pinches can be locat-
ed. Next I criticize their attempt to eliminate the realm of obligation from 
morality. Then I examine their treatment of Martha Nussbaum's work on 
Aristotle in order to explore differences between secular and Christian appro-
priations of Aristotle. Finally, I discuss their views on the virtue of obedience 
and criticize their arguments against rival Kantian and divine command views. 
Exactly forty years have passed since G. E. M. Anscombe made a famous 
attack on modern moral philosophy. According to Anscombe, something 
is amiss in the deontological part of moral thought. Her recommendation 
is that "the concepts of obligation and duty-moral obligation and moral 
duty, that is to say-and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the 
moral sense of 'ought', ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possi-
ble; because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earli-
er conception of ethics which no longer generally survives, and are only 
harmful without it." I The earlier conception of ethics is a conception of 
divine law ethics. In that conception, Anscombe argues, "the ordinary 
(and quite indispensable) terms 'should', 'needs', 'ought', 'muse-acquired 
[a] special sense by being equated in the relevant contexts with 'is obliged', 
or 'is bound', or 'is required to', in the sense in which one can be obliged or 
bound by law, or something can be required by law."2 She characterizes a 
divine law ethics and the consequences of its waning in modernity in the 
following famous passage: 
To have a law conception of ethics is to hold that what is needed for 
conformity with the virtues failure in which is the mark of being bad 
qua man (and not merely, say qua craftsman or logician)-that what is 
needed for this is required by divine law. Naturally it is not possible 
to have such a conception unless you believe in God as a law-giver; 
like Jews, Stoics and Christians. But if such a conception is dominant 
for many centuries, and then is given up, it is a natural result that the 
concepts of 'obligation', of being bound or required as by a law, 
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should remain though they had lost their root; and if the word 
"ought" has become invested in certain contexts with the sense of 
"obligation", it too will remain to be spoken with a special emphasis 
and a special feeling in these contexts.' 
But outside a divine law conception of ethics this special emphasis and 
feeling are no longer appropriate because the concept that would properly 
evoke them no longer makes sense. As Anscombe diagnoses the situation, 
it "was the interesting one of the survival of a concept outside the frame-
work of thought that made it a really intelligible one."4 The upshot is that 
we should, if we can, get along without the moral 'ought' understood in 
the sense in which it is equated with being obliged as if by law, and we 
should instead do ethics employing other concepts. Anscombe says: 
I should judge that Hume and our present-day ethicists had done a 
considerable service by showing that no content could be found in 
the notion "morally ought"; if it were not that the latter philosophers 
try to find an alternative (very fishy) content and to retain the psy-
chological force of the term. It would be most reasonable to drop it. 
It has no reasonable sense outside a law conception of ethics; they are 
not going to maintain such a conception; and you can do ethics with-
out it, as is shown by the example of Aristotle.s 
So apparently Anscombe thinks modern moral philosophy would be better 
off if it stopped using the term 'morally ought' and, presumably, also such 
related deontological terms as 'moral obligation,' 'moral duty,' 'moral 
right' and 'moral wrong.' And her reference to Aristotle should remind us 
of the revival of interest in Aristotelian virhle ethics that has taken place 
among philosophers in the years since she wrote. 
In a recent book in moral theology, Christians among the Virtues: 
Theological Conversations with Ancient and Modern Ethics, Stanley Hauerwas 
and Charles Pinches in effect try to do what Anscombe recommends, 
though they do not give her credit for having made the recommendation.' 
This essay is a critical discussion of some of what Hauerwas and Pinches 
have to say in that book, particularly in their chapter on the virtue of obedi-
ence. It has four parts. First I consider briefly several possible responses to 
Anscombe's attack on modern moral philosophy in order to provide a 
framework in which the particular strategy adopted by Hauerwas and 
Pinches can be located. Next I discuss the way in which Hauerwas and 
Pinches try to eliminate from their moral thought the realm of obligation. 
Then I examine their treatment of Martha Nussbaum's Aristotelianism in 
order to show how a Christian appropriation of Aristotle's ethical thought 
differs from that of other moral philosophers. Finally I criticize their 
account of the virtue of obedience and state some conclusions. 
I 
The deontological family of moral concepts includes moral requirement 
(obligation), moral permission (rightness) and moral prohibition (wrong-
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ness). If Anscombe is right, they are not really intelligible outside of a 
divine law conception of ethics. So unless one has such a conception, as 
many traditional monotheists still do, one would do well to cease using 
these concepts in one's moral thinking and, to avoid confusion, to drop the 
terms that traditionally expressed them from one's moral discourse. It is 
worth noting at the outset that Anscombe's attack creates no problem for 
an ethics of divine commands. Even if she is right, divine command theo-
rists can continue in good conscience to think and speak of moral obliga-
tions imposed by divine commands and things being moral wrong 
because of divine prohibitions. So one way to salvage the deontological 
part of morality is to become a divine command theorist. As we shall see, 
Hauerwas and Pinches reject this option. So will secular moral theorists. 
What other options do secular moral theorists have? 
A Kantian conception of the moral law might be thought of as a secular-
ized replacement for divine commands. On such a view, one's own practi-
cal reason is a faculty of self-legislation; it imposes moral obligations. So 
secular moral theorists might try to salvage the deontological part of 
morality by becoming Kantians. Anscombe treats the Kantian conception 
with scorn. She says: "Kant introduces the idea of 'legislating for oneself', 
which is as absurd as if in these days, when majority votes command great 
respect, one were to call each reflective decision a man made a vote result-
ing in a majority, which as a matter of proportion is overwhelming, for it is 
always 1-0."7 And she adds: 'That legislation can be 'for oneself' I reject as 
absurd: whatever you do 'for yourself may be admirable; but is not legis-
lating."s As we shall see, Hauerwas and Pinches reject the Kantian concep-
tion for other reasons. It is, of course, possible to dispute Anscombe's view 
of the Kantian conception. As James Conant points out, "this would 
require taking issue with Anscombe's cursory dismissal of Kant's concep-
tion of the moral law (as a law one gives oneself) as 'absurd'.'''! Anscombe 
has charged the Kantian conception with absurdity, but she has by no 
means proven that it is absurd. In this essay I shall not enter into a dispute 
with Anscombe on this point. Later on, however, I will challenge the argu-
ments Hauerwas and Pinches direct against Kant. 
Another response secular moral theorists might make to Anscombe's 
point is to keep the deontological terms but use them to express concepts 
other than those that are at home only in a divine law conception of ethics. 
Though he does not describe his project in these terms, I think this is what 
Bernard Williams is up to in the chapter called "Morality, the Peculiar 
Institution" in his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Williams argues that 
the peculiar institution of morality contains several philosophical mistakes. 
One of them is that "it misunderstands obligations, not seeing how they 
form just one type of ethical consideration."lo According to Williams, 
"morality encourages the idea, ollly an obligation call beat all obligation."ll 
This idea is, of course, at home in an ethics of divine law or divine com-
mands. There the obligations all things considered imposed by divine law 
or divine commands are naturally supposed to be prescriptively overrid-
ing, beating ethical considerations of all other kinds. It is, as Williams sees, 
a much less plausible idea in the context of a secular moral theory. 
Suppose, to use his example, you are under an obligation to visit a friend 
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because you have promised to, and you are presented with a unique 
opportunity, at the same time but in a different place, to further significant-
ly some important cause. Williams thinks you may reasonably conclude 
that you should take the opportunity to further the cause. Williams does 
not deny that there are obligations. He says: 
Considerations that are given deliberative priority in order to secure 
reliability constitute obligations; corresponding to those obligations 
are rights, possessed by people who benefit from the obligations. 
One type of obligations is picked out by the basic and standing 
importance of the interests they serve. These are all negative in force, 
concerning what we should not do. Another, and now positive, sort 
involves the obligations of immediacy. Here, a high deliberative pri-
ority is imposed by an emergency.12 
So Williams offers a deflationary account of obligations; they are real 
enough but not always prescriptively overriding. When he says, of the 
peculiar institution of morality, that "we would be better off without it,"13 
the implication is not that there are no obligations or that we should refrain 
from speaking of obligations. It is rather than the obligations there are do 
not have the importance attributed to them by the peculiar institution of 
morality. I do not think Anscombe's attack damages the substance of the 
deflationary account proposed by Williams. She might claim that it is con-
fusing to speak of what is constituted by the considerations given delibera-
tive priority to secure reliability and to respond to emergencies as "obliga-
tions." But she might not complain as long as Williams refrains from 
speaking of them as "moral obligations" with a special emphasis and feel-
ing. Hence it seems to me that Williams has shown that secular moral the-
orist can salvage at least a deflated version of the deontological part of 
morality. 
A secular moral theorist uninterested in the project of salvaging moral 
deontology might well see promise in the recent revival of virtue ethics in 
the Aristotelian tradition. There is much to be learned from Aristotle if 
one's enterprise is refurbishing the pagan virtues. But a Christian ethics of 
the virtues must be wary of Aristotle. As John Casey points out, pagan 
virtues are at odds with Christian moral sensibilities: 
For Christianity rejects the worldliness implicit in the ethic of the 
virtues, and abhors the values that go with such worldliness. Pride, 
the desire for honor, and still more wealth and beauty, have nothing to 
do with Christian goodness. Even those active virtues (so admired by 
Hume and Gibbon) which make a man formidable, great, a valuable 
member of a city state, have always met with an equivocal response 
from the Christian tradition. Meekness, humility, a conviction that 
human corruption cannot be overcome by human effort, a rejection of 
the world and its pomps, are at the centre of the Christian moral con-
sciousness. And Christianity, like Stoicism, has always held that the 
true good for man-including what we would now call 'moral good-
ness' -cannot possibly depend upon the vagaries of fortune. l4 
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So if, like Thomas Aquinas, contemporary Christian moral theorists pro-
pose to learn from Aristotelian virtue ethics, their task will be to engage in 
a very selective appropriation of Aristotle. In this they will be following 
the example of Aquinas. As Jeffrey Stout notes in portraying him as a 
moral bricoleur, "his real accomplishment was to bring together into a sin-
gle whole a wide assortment of fragments-Platonic, Stoic, Pauline, Jewish, 
Islamic, Augustinian, and Aristotelian."15 
We are now in a position to provide some context for the project in 
moral theology that engages Hauerwas and Pinches in their book. Like 
Anscombe, they propose to reject moral deontology and are hostile to 
Kant. They also reject contemporary divine command conceptions of 
ethics and ignore other forms of an ethics of divine law. Unlike Williams, 
they have no interest in a deflationary account of moral deontology. And 
like Aquinas, they want to engage in selective appropriation of materials 
from the Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics. 
11 
Hauerwas and Pinches are deeply hostile to moral deontology. They 
portray it as involving what they call a 'special realm of obligation.' They 
want to rid us of the special realm of obligation: 
Here the imagined "moral life" is one of a number of life's compart-
ments; it is a region or realm of obligation into which people wander 
when they encounter a dilemma and outside of which they can live 
as they like. "Morality" conceived as a special realm of obligation is 
what Bernard Williams, in a strong but helpful turn of words, calls "a 
peculiar institution." As he maintains, it is an institution we are bet-
ter off without, even if its presentation by Kant and others is strange-
ly compelling (pp. 55-56). 
If Hauerwas and Pinches were merely trying to make the point that there is 
more to ethics than moral deontology, it would be entirely appropriate for 
them to cite Williams in support of their point. But the point they are try-
ing to make is a more radical one. 
This becomes apparent when they criticize moral philosophers who 
combine virtues and obligations in their theories. According to Hauerwas 
and Pinches, 
... serious defenses of virtue can and have performed the helpful func-
tion of displacing those ideas about morality that presume the special 
realm of obligation, ideas that have proved immensely hard to shake. 
On that score, it is worth noting that even within the new philosophi-
cal defenses of virtue, the special realm of obligation has a way of 
reappearing. For example, some assume that virtue is best appropri-
ated when appended to a morality of duty. They seek an ethics of 
virtue that can complement or supplement our duties (p. 57). 
They cite Philippa Foot and William K. Frankena as examples of moral 
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philosophers who combine virtue and obligation. And then they go on to 
say this: "Frankena and Foot are representatives, perhaps, of a generation 
of philosophers so thoroughly schooled in the dominant Kantian or utili-
tarian modes of reflection about ethics that relinquishing the special realm 
of obligation is simply not an option" (p. 58). If we take this literally, the 
point Hauerwas and Pinches want to make is that moral theorists ought to 
relinquish the special realm of obligation altogether; they should not even 
try to combine obligation with other considerations such as virtue. In other 
words, they want to say that it is a mistake to yield to obligation exclusive 
possession of, or too large a place in, the moral life. But they also want to 
say that it is a mistake to yield to obligation any place in the moral life. It is 
fair enough to cite Williams in support of the first of these claims. 
However, since, as we have seen, Williams believes that there are obliga-
tions, it would not be fair to cite him in support of the second. Like Foot 
and Frankena, he should be a target of criticism for Hauerwas and Pinches. 
Another recent virtue theorist, Edmund Pincoffs, is the target of similar 
criticism. Hauerwas and Pinches take him to task for reintroducing "the 
special jurisdiction of obligation when he devises a separate category 
among his many and various virtues called 'the mandatory virtues'" (p. 
58). What is more, "Pincoffs's 'mandatory virtues' are remarkably like 
what one might call democratic virtues, or those which conduce to life in 
an 'open society'" (p. 59). And this is a bad thing, according to Hauerwas 
and Pinches, because it shows that Pincoffs is committed to what they call 
'Enlightenment liberalism,' which is a bete noire for them. 
It is striking that Hauerwas and Pinches offer no real argument for the 
radical claim that moral theorists ought to relinquish the special realm of 
obligation. They could not offer the sort of argument Anscombe offers 
against moral deontology. Her argument is directed to secular moral theo-
rists who lack the divine law conception of ethics outside of which moral 
deontology of a certain kind does not make sense. But Hauerwas and 
Pinches are not secular moral theorists; they profess to be Christian moral 
theologians. They stand in a tradition that makes available to them the 
divine law conception of ethics, and they know that they do. They say: 
"Christianity is not wedded to self-expression in terms of virtue, as is 
borne out by the existence of alternatives such as obedience to God's law or 
as discipleship of Jesus" (p. 57). So they could not address to Christians 
moral philosophers and theologians, or to themselves, the type of argu-
ment Anscombe addresses to secular moral theorists. But then why should 
they deprive themselves of the vocabulary of moral deontology? Such a 
self-denying ordinance is very puzzling. Though it is purely speculative, 
my guess is that they think moral deontology is the exclusive property of 
Enlightenment liberalism. If they do, they are mistaken, as the divine com-
mand tradition in Christian ethics shows. 
It seems clear that the project of relinquishing moral deontology could 
consistently be carried out. If it is, there is a price to be paid. One must 
then never say, with special emphasis and feeling, such things as 
'Torturing the innocent is morally wrong!' It is far from clear that 
Christian moral philosophers and theologians should be willing to pay this 
price. 
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III 
It is important to realize that the recovery of Aristotelian ethics in recent 
years has been made to serve at least two distinct projects of moral inquiry. 
One is secular and is attracted by Aristotle's optimistic paganism. Martha 
Nussbaum represents this sort of interest in reviving Aristotle. She 
remarks that Aristotle "holds that human beings are naturally drawn 
toward virtue rather than vice, love more than repudiation-and that, 
given sufficient education, material support, and personal effort, most peo-
ple will be able to make good and reasonable lives for themselves" (my 
emphasis). Ii, On this view, the attractive prospect Aristotle's ethical 
thought offers us is that, if fortune favors them, human beings can, operat-
ing on their own steam, so to speak, flourish and so be happy over the 
course of an earthly lifetime. And these achievements are independent of 
religion. Noting that Aristotle does not place piety on his list of virtues, 
Nussbaum conjectures that "this probably indicates his interest in separat-
ing practical reason from religious authority, and in keeping reason, rather 
than such authorities, in control of the most important matters."17 In other 
words, practical reason operating apart from religion offers us our best 
shot at working out for ourselves good lives. 
Needless to say, such optimism is alien to traditional Christian thought. 
It insists that humans in their present condition are fallen and, if left to 
themselves, incapable of flourishing in this life. Such human flourishing as 
is possible must take place against a background of ceaseless struggle to 
overcome interior evil. It can never be a wholly human achievement, 
something people make for themselves if they are lucky. It must always be 
at least in part a divine gift. Nor is practical reason itself exempt from the 
infirmities of the fallen human condition. A traditional Christian is, there-
fore, likely to regard as naive confidence in the ability of unaided practical 
reason to rule well in the most important matters in our lives. 
Another project of moral inquiry with an interest in reviving Aristotle is 
a distinctively Christian ethics of the virtues. This is the project that 
engages the attention of Hauerwas and Pinches in their book. To their 
credit, they realize that they must pick and choose among the Aristotelian 
virtues. They say: "Indeed, Christians must be prepared not only to see 
pagan virtues transformed, they must expect to see many deleted and oth-
ers added, such as hope, obedience, or patience" (p. 29). Among the 
Aristotelian virtues that will have to be transformed or deleted is magna-
nimity. Aristotle's magnanimous man is a man of pride, eager to give gifts 
but reluctant to receive them. Christian scripture presents a different pic-
ture of the admirable: "Let the same mind be in you that was in Christ 
Jesus, who, though he was in the form of God, did not regard equality with 
God as something to be exploited, but emptied himself, taking the form of 
a slave being born in human likeness. And being found in human form, he 
humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death---even death 
on a crosS."I" After quoting these verses, Hauerwas and Pinches observe 
that "the humility and 'emptying,' which stand out in this passage, offer 
stark contrast to the pride of the magnanimous man" (p. 46). Because their 
agenda differs from Nussbaum's, it is to be expected that they will disagree 
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with her when they comment on her treatment of Aristotle. And, indeed, 
they do. 
A major point of disagreement concerns friendship (philia). Hauerwas 
and Pinches are troubled by Nussbaum's decision to discuss political rela-
tionships and friendship in separate sections of Chapter 12 of The Fragility 
of Goodness. They hold that a division of politics and friendship is not 
traceable to Aristotle. To support this claim they quote the following pas-
sage from the Nicomachean Ethics: 
We may see even in our travels how near and dear every man is to 
every other. Friendship seems too to hold states together, and law-
givers to care more for it than for justice; for unanimity seems to be 
something like friendship, and this they aim at most of all, and expel 
factions as their worst enemy; and when men are friends they have no 
need of justice, while when they are just they need friendship as well, 
and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality.19 
Hauerwas and Pinches think Nussbaum makes this division because she is 
a liberal and means to liberalize Aristotle. They say: "That she feels com-
pelled to separate political relations from friendship, particularly when 
explicating Aristotle in whose works no such distinction is to be found, is 
evidence of this" (p. 73). They go on to speak of "the false division she has 
set up between friendship and political associations" (p. 74) and of 
"Nussbaum's liberal subversion of Aristotle's politics" (p. 81). As they see 
it, "friendship for Aristotle is a politics," and they complain that "for 
Nussbaum friendship is not this, for she is a modern person, a modern lib-
eral, and so does not conceive of political relationships in this way" (p. 78). 
In my opinion, this line of argument is more than a little unfair to 
Nussbaum. In a sentence about Aristotle's views that Hauerwas and 
Pinches quote in part, she says this: "Furthermore, love and friendship, 
and the part of political excellence that is a type of friendship or love (if 
not, indeed, the entirety of political excellence), are in their nature relations, 
rather than virtuous states (hexeis)-plus-activities."2o And in a note to this 
sentence, in which she refers to the passage from the Nicomachean Ethics 
quoted by Hauerwas and Pinches, she goes on to say that "the important 
topic of civic philia (which, in Aristotle's view, 'holds cities together' even 
more than justice does-1155a22-7) has received little comment in the liter-
ature."2! So there can be no doubt that Nussbaum knows that Aristotle 
thought that one type of philia is civic or political. However, it does not fol-
low that Aristotle thought that all types of phi/ia are political. As 
Nussbaum points out, for Aristotle, "philia includes many relationships 
that would not be classified as friendships. The love of mother and child is 
a paradigmatic case of philia; all close family relations, including the rela-
tion of husband and wife, are so characterized."22 Hence it seems legiti-
mate for Nussbaum to separate the discussion of friendships other than 
political friendships, as well as relations of philia other than friendships, 
from the discussion of political relationships. Nor does the conclusion that, 
for Aristotle, friendship is a politics follow from Aristotle's view that one 
type of friendship is political. And Hauerwas and Pinches cite no textual 
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evidence to support the claim that Aristotle accepts the view they attribute 
to him. 
What is more, Hauerwas and Pinches provide in the book no argument 
for the claim that Nussbaum's decision to discuss political relationships 
and friendship separately is motivated by a wish to liberalize Aristotle?' 
To my mind, a more plausible explanation of the decision is that 
Nussbaum sees that political friendship or civic philia cannot have in the 
politics of a modern, pluralistic democratic state the importance possible 
for it in a Greek polis. She writes: "We must recall at this point that the 
Greek polis was both more pervasive and more immediate than a modem 
democratic regime. Its values organized and permeated the entire lives of 
its citizens, including their moral education."2' Except in some cases at the 
local level, this is not the case in modern pluralistic democracies, and so 
they yield a less fertile soil for the growth of political friendship or civic 
ph ilia. So if we wish to appropriate Aristotle to help us understand our 
own politics, we have no choice but to downplay his emphasis on friend-
ship in politics. To do so is not to liberalize Aristotle; it is merely to 
acknowledge some facts about modern political life. 
But Hauerwas and Pinches think Christians can appropriate what they 
take to be Aristotle's insights about civic friendship in a way that 
Nussbaum cannot. They say: 
As Christians of all ages have maintained, the Christian is a Christian 
in the church; she cannot know what being a Christian entails apart 
from the community of friends who together form one another into 
selves who reflect the image of their God. In this way Christians (and 
other groups who have something similar to what Christians call an 
ecclesiology) should be in a position to appropriate Aristotle's 
insights about plzilia as Nussbaum cannot, particularly those who 
assume friendship is a kind of politics (p. 81). 
A sketch of the ecclesiology is provided by their remark that "we are 
formed by philia in the church to become a community which in its corpo-
rate life in the world loves the world in the manner of agape, whose practice 
it has learned in seeking to conform itself to the God who is in Christ" (p. 
82). At first blush" the idea that Christian communities should be consti-
tuted by relations of philia among their members seems attractive. 
However, a certain amount of skepticism is in order about whether this is 
feasible for all Christian communities. It seems an attainable goal for a 
small Quaker Meeting; it is probably out of reach for the large and hierar-
chical Roman Catholic Church as a whole. 
Moreover, Hauerwas and Pinches explicitly propose to appropriate 
Aristotle's philia only in their ecclesiology. To the extent that this is a poli-
tics, it is an ecclesiastical politics, an internal politics for one or more 
Christian denominations. Hauerwas and Pinches do not suggest that a 
politics of civic friendship is either feasible or desirable for the whole of a 
large, religiously pluralistic democratic nation-state. And nothing in 
Nussbaum's position is inconsistent with the idea of the internal politics of 
at least some of the religious denominations found among the voluntary 
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associations in a pluralistic democracy being based on friendship. In other 
words, in a religiously pluralistic democracy, a politics of ecclesiastical 
friendship at the level of an individual religious denomination is consistent 
with a politics in which civic friendship is relatively unimportant at the 
national level. So Hauerwas and Pinches have not shown that Christians 
can appropriate Aristotle's insights about philia in a way that Nussbaum 
cannot. Nor have they shown that she is mistaken in separating the discus-
sion of philia from the discussion political associations when the topic in 
view is the politics of a religiously pluralistic democracy rather than 
Christian ecclesiastical politics. On the subject of friendship, then, 
Hauerwas and Pinches have failed to deliver an effective critique of 
Nussbaum's treatment of Aristotle. 
IV 
Obedience is not an Aristotelian virtue, but it is a Thomistic virtue. 
Aquinas classifies it as a part of a part of the virtue of justice, but he claims 
that obedience to God is the greatest of the moral virtues. In the Summa 
Theologiae, he argues that moral virtues are to be ranked in accord with the 
principle that the greater the thing a person turns away from in order to 
adhere to God, the greater the virtue. Human goods that may be turned 
away from for God's sake are, in order of increasing greatness, external 
goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. Among goods of the 
soul, the will is the highest because it is by the will that humans make use 
of all other goods. It follows that "properly speaking, the virtue of obedi-
ence, whereby we contemn our own will for God's sake, is more praise-
worthy than the other moral virtues, which contemn other goods for the 
sake of God."ls In addition, other acts of virtue have no merit in God's eyes 
unless they are done out of obedience to God's will. "For were one to suf-
fer even martyrdom, or to give all one's goods to the poor," Aquinas 
insists, "unless one directed these things to the fulfillment of the divine 
will, which pertains directly to obedience, they could not be meritorious."ll> 
Neither would such things be meritorious if they were done without chari-
ty, he continues, but that theological virtue "cannot exist apart from obedi-
ence."l? Hence, according to Aquinas, obedience to God's will is not only 
the most praiseworthy of the moral virtues but also a necessary condition 
of both merit in God's eyes and charity. 
Aquinas thinks God is to be obeyed in all things. Some of the cases 
called 'the immoralities of the patriarchs' form the basis for an objection he 
considers. No one, he assumes, is bound to do anything contrary to virtue. 
But it seems that the divine command to Abraham to slay his innocent son 
(Genesis 22:1-2) and the divine command to the Jews to plunder the 
Egyptians (Exodus 11:2) are contrary to justice, and that the divine com-
mand to Hosea to take unto himself a woman who was an adulteress 
(Hosea 1:2 and 3:1) is contrary to chastity. Hence it seems that God is not 
to be obeyed in all things. The reply Aquinas gives to this objection puts 
the case for the primacy of God's will in Christian ethics in a powerful 
way. "God can command nothing contrary to virtue," Aquinas assures us, 
"since virtue and rectitude of human will consist chiefly in conformity with 
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God's will and obedience to His command, although it be contrary to the 
wonted mode of virtue."28 He then proceeds to deal with the three cases. 
God's command to Abraham to slay his innocent son is not contrary to jus-
tice because God is the author of life and death. God's command to the 
Jews to plunder the Egyptians is not contrary to justice because all things 
really belong to God and he gives them to whom he wilL And God's com-
mand to Hosea to take unto himself an adulteress is not contrary to chasti-
ty because, God being the ordainer of human generation, the right manner 
of sexual intercourse is that which he appoints. For Aquinas, an action 
willed and commanded by God cannot be contrary to virtue; God's will 
and his commands determine which actions are virtuous. Obedience to 
God can never be contrary to virtue. 
In their chapter entitled "Is Obedience a Virtue?," Hauerwas and 
Pinches return a positive answer to the title's question. Against Patrick 
Nowell-Smith, they argue that obedience is not virtuous only in young 
children who are morally immature 2Cj It is not to be superseded by autono-
my in the course of development to moral maturity. Kantians will agree. 
They will count obedience to the moral law within as virtuous, though 
they will also argue that such obedience is compatible with moral autono-
my properly understood because the moral law within is the law of one's 
own practical reason. So too will divine command theorists. They will 
count obedience to God's commands as virtuous because divine com-
mands impose moral obligations. But Hauerwas and Pinches do not want 
Kantians and divine command theorists as allies, and so they devote a 
good deal of their chapter on obedience to criticizing Kant and divine com-
mand theory. I shall try to show that the criticism they offer is flawed. 
Hauerwas and Pinches apparently have some qualms about lumping 
divine command theorists together with Kant. In a long note that is almost 
apologetic in tone, they say: "We have taken the bold and perhaps foolish 
step of classing all recent divine command theories of ethics in the context 
of what MacIntyre calls the Enlightenment project...somewhat cavalierly, 
we try to display the difficulties of all these theories by attacking 
Kant...More than a direct attack on Kant, what we here attempt to show is 
that the kind of obedience presumed by his (and the divine command the-
orists') account of morality is impoverished or, as we say, 'flattened'" (p. 
2(4). As I see it, however, there is no need for Hauerwas and Pinches to 
feel qualms about associating divine command theorists with Kant. As 
John Hare points out, "Kant himself believed in a form of divine command 
theory, that we should think of our duties as divine commands."1() Kant 
says: "Religion is (subjectively regarded) the recognition of all duties as 
divine commands."3! Of course, some divine command theorists will think 
that Kant does not go far enough; they will suspect that he means to assert 
only that we should think of our duties as if they were divinely command-
ed. But even if this is correct, I see no reason to disagree with Hare's claim 
that Kant believed in a form of divine command theory. So I do not find it 
foolish or cavalier of Hauenvas and Pinches to try to tar Kant and the 
divine command theorists with the same critical brush. 
What are Hauerwas and Pinches getting at when they speak of the kind 
of obedience presumed by the accounts of morality offered by Kant and 
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the divine command theorists as impoverished or flattened? In the case of 
Kant, it is easy to see what bothers them. They remark: "On Kant's pro-
posal there is no person to whom obedience is offered; there is no active 
second will to whom we, in our obedience, must conform our will. In 
Kant's scheme, we obey, but our obedience is not offered to another" (p. 
139). The result is that Kantian obedience is an impoverished sort of obedi-
ence or, perhaps, not real obedience at all. Hauerwas and Pinches insist: 
Obedience, on the other hand, implies an acquiescence which is possi-
ble only when the one who obeys places his trust in his lord. It 
includes a surrendering of what he wants, as does Kant's acting "from 
duty," but the surrender is offered willingly, not just because he 
knows he has a duty to obey but because he trusts the one he obeys. 
Kant's obedience to the moral law cannot include this crucial subtlety, 
since it is not offered to a person, God, who can be loved or hated, 
trusted or scorned, but rather to a formula, whose formulators are 
none other than ourselves. It is a flattened sort of obedience (p. 140). 
As they see it, then, Kant's obedience is flattened because it is ultimately 
obedience to ourselves rather than to another person. 
But there are several points at which this line of argument is open to 
being challenged. For openers, Hauerwas and Pinches are clearly mistak-
en about the conditions of possibility of obedience. In the modern military, 
soldiers succeed in obeying officers who are clearly not their lords and 
may not, initially at least, even be trusted. Second, it is far from clear that 
Kantians ultimately obey only themselves. If we take seriously Kant's 
claim that religion is the recognition of all duties as divine commands, we 
will have to acknowledge that religious Kantians at least ultimately obey 
both the moral law given to them by their own practical reason and God. 
And even if we restrict our attention to secular Kantians, it is far from clear 
that their obedience is flattened in any objectionable way. To be sure, 
obeying a person and obeying a law differ in some ways. However, the 
moral law a Kantian is supposed to obey is not an arbitrary command 
addressed to the self or a merely subjective piece of self-legislation; it is a 
deliverance of practical reason and so has objective practical necessity. 
And practical reason itself is both the common possession of all normal 
humans and part of what gives them dignity and makes them ends in 
themselves. So while obeying a God whom one trusts does differ from 
obeying practical reason's law, an argument would be needed to show that 
the latter is flatter than the former in any way that implies a negative eval-
uation of the latter in comparison to the former. Hauerwas and Pinches 
provide no such argument. 
Even if there were such an argument that could be directed against sec-
ular Kantians, it is hard to see how it could be converted into an argument 
against divine command morality. Divine command theorists, after all, 
hold that it is God who is to be obeyed. But Hauerwas and Pinches have 
two other objections to divine command theories. The first is a variant of a 
familiar complaint. They state it as follows: 
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For the God who commands could have commanded anything; it 
only so happens that God somehow decided to command us to 
refrain from murder and theft, a coincidence that provides divine 
command theorists with considerable relief from what might have 
been a quite embarrassing situation. In their relief the divine com-
mand theorists generally fail to note that trusting and worshipping a 
god who might have commanded us to do anything at all seems to 
have lost its point and so, for that matter, has obeying him (p. 140). 
Hauerwas and Pinches give credit for their second objection to Alasdair 
MacIntyre.32 As they paraphrase his point, "the god whom one obeys on a 
divine command theory of morality might be any god. It doesn't matter 
that it is this particular god, for example, the God of Israel and of Jesus" (p. 
141). I see little merit in either of these objections. 
No doubt some divine command theorists have maintained that God 
could have commanded anything, even murder and theft. Perhaps 
Ockham is an example. But clearly other divine command theorists dis-
agree. Edward Wierenga is an example. Responding to an objection by 
Ralph Cud worth that is similar to the first objection advanced by 
Hauerwas and Pinches but predates it by centuries, Wierenga points out 
that a divine command theorist might believe that God is essentially whol-
ly good. If so, "the divine command theorist might hold that certain fea-
tures of God's character, for example, that he is essentially just and that he 
is essentially loving, place constraints on what God would command.//33 A 
divine command theorist who held this view could admit that if God were 
to command someone to bring about an innocent child's suffering gratu-
itous cruelty, it would be obligatory for that person to bring about an inno-
cent child's suffering gratuitous cruelty. But, as Wierenga goes on to note, 
such a theorist could also hold that the antecedent of this counterfactuaJ 
conditional is impossible because there is no possible world in which God 
commands someone to bring about an innocent child's suffering gratuitous 
cruelty. According to the standard accounts of counterfactuals, a counter-
factual with an impossible antecedent is trivially true. Hence such a divine 
command theorist could hold that this counterfactual and others like it are 
true while denying that God could have commanded anything. So the first 
objection set forth by Hauerwas and Pinches does not refute all divine 
command theories or even all extant divine command theories. In particu-
lar, it does not refute Wierenga's theory. 
The objection Hauerwas and Pinches derive from MacIntyre is at best an 
exaggeration, and they know it. In a note to the page immediately preced-
ing the one on which the paraphrase I have quoted appears, they say that 
"the question of what sort of god does the commanding has by no means 
been absent from the debate about the merits of divine command theories 
of morality" (p. 203). They cite the work of Robert M. Adams for confirma-
tion of this point. In the seminal paper that started the recent revival of 
interest in divine command morality, Adams proposed a theory in which 
being contrary to the commands of loving God is part of the meaning of 
being morally wrong in the discourse of some Jewish and Christian believ-
ers.34 He later switched to the view that the property of moral wrongness is 
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identical to the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving 
God.35 And, as we have seen, it is important for the treatment of the 
immoralities of the patriarchs offered by Aquinas that the God whose com-
mands are to be obeyed is the author of life and death, he to whom all 
things really belong, and the ordainer of human generation. So it is simply 
false that the god whom one obeys on a divine command theory could be 
any god. It does matter that the god whom one obeys has many of the 
properties of the God of Israel and Jesus such as being loving and being 
creator of all contingent realities. Perhaps the god whom one obeys on a 
divine command theory does not have to be the particular God of Judaism 
or Christianity. However, this god must be at least one of the Gods 
allowed by generic monotheism. Zeus, Poseidon, and the other gods of 
Greek polytheism will not do. 
There is one argument Hauerwas and Pinches explicitly direct against 
both Kant and divine command theorists. It is this: 
Ironically, by elevating obedience to constitute morality Kant and the 
divine command theorists diminish the meaning and significance of 
actually obeying someone in a relationship. Since for them obedience 
is equivalent to acting morally, there can be no other virtue than obe-
dience. But of course this can mean nothing other than that the 
virtues disappear, including, ultimately, the virtue of obedience, 
since it can no longer be understood alongside other virtues (p. 142). 
Hauerwas and Pinches take it to be an advantage of their account of obedi-
ence that it allows obedience to be "easily placed alongside other apparent 
virtues" (p. 144). They observe that "one obvious virtue is temperance, 
which seems a necessary condition for obedience, since without it we are 
given over to the concupiscible appetites and cannot entertain anything 
other than what we desire at a particular moment" (p. 143). And they go 
on to note that other skills are demanded to make obedience prompt or to 
discern the will of another when it is tacit rather than expressed. 
Divine command theorists, however, are not precluded from placing 
obedience alongside other virtues. They will, of course, insist that obedi-
ence is a very important virtue. Maybe they will claim that it is the chief 
virtue of the realm of moral deontology. But they need not concede that 
moral deontology is the whole of morality. Perhaps, like Aquinas, they 
will assume that obedience to God is the greatest or the most praiseworthy 
virtue. However, it does not follow from this assumption that obedience to 
God is the only virtue. As a matter of historical fact, both Aquinas and 
Kant recognized virtues other than obedience, and they were consistent in 
doing so. Divine command theorists can consistently follow them in doing 
this. So, once again, Hauerwas and Pinches miss the mark with their criti-
cism. 
In keeping with their project of relinquishing moral deontology, 
Hauerwas and Pinches never use the word 'obligation' in their discussion 
of the virtue of obedience. Curiously, however, they do speak in ways that 
seem to presuppose the intelligibility of the concepts of moral deontology. 
In a passage I have already quoted, they speak of it being a flaw in Kant's 
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proposal that "there is no active second will to whom we, in our obedience, 
must conform our will" (p. 139, my emphasis). And they claim that, within 
the context of an historical and personal relationship, "God issues com-
mands which Christians must obey" (p. 141, my emphasis). The 'must' in 
such passages is the 'must' of practical necessity. Now since God is per-
fectly good, it is surely a good thing that we conform our wills to God's 
will and obey God's commands. But why must we do so? According to 
Bernard Williams, the 'must' of practical necessity is "a 'must' that is 
unconditional and goes all the way dOWIl."36 He tells us that Kant "was con-
cerned with the recognition of an I must that is unconditional and goes all 
the way down, but he construed this unconditional practical necessity as 
being peculiar to morality."" On the deflationary account of obligation 
Williams offers, Kant's construal is mistaken. But if Kant's construal is cor-
rect, we must obey the moral law because it specifies our moral obliga-
tions. Similarly, a divine command theorist can answer our question by 
saying that we must obey God's commands because they impose moral 
obligations on us. This answer is not available to Hauerwas and Pinches. 
They offer no other answer. 
Hauerwas and Pinches have some helpful things to say about what is 
distinctive in Christian obedience. Referring to the kenosis hymn from 
Philippians quoted above, they suggest that Christ's obedience to the 
Father, which was obedience unto death on a cross, should be paradigmat-
ic for Christians. They go on to say this: 
Indeed, the Christian can never conceive of herself as having moved 
beyond obedience, since she, like Christ, does not will independence 
but rather radical dependence, by which her own purposes meld 
with God's as she comes to share God's mind. This obedience makes 
sense only in the light of Christ's obedience, which transformed cre-
ation precisely because it opened up the possibility of a community 
of diverse persons who come willingly to share in one another's pur-
poses (p. 148). 
The first sentence in this passage seems to me to be right on target, but its 
second sentence is surely false. Communities of diverse persons who will-
ingly shared in one another's purposes were actual long before the birth of 
Jesus. Even hunter gatherer societies could not exist without diverse per-
sons willingly sharing at least some purposes. 
Near the beginning of their book, Hauerwas and Pinches tell us that it 
was not written solely for their fellow moral theologians. They say that 
they "are hopeful that this book might attract a wider readership, including 
some philosophers" (p. xii). I think Christian philosophers who read it will 
come away with mixed feelings. On the one hand, they do make many 
insightful remarks about particular Christian virtues. I have given an exam-
ple from their chapter on obedience; other examples are to be found in their 
chapters on hope, courage, and patience. On the other hand, they do not 
make the contribution to a philosophical conversation about ethics that their 
subtitle, "Theological Conversations with Ancient and Modern Ethics," 
might lead a philosopher to expect from the book. This failure is due to the 
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poor quality of their arguments. They move, without adequate argumenta-
tive support, from the sensible view that moral deontology is not the whole 
of ethics to the implausible view that moral deontology is no part of ethics 
and should be relinquished. They move, again without adequate argumen-
tative support, from the correct observation that Nussbaum discusses politi-
cal associations and philia separately to the improbable conclusion that she 
is engaged in a liberal subversion of Aristotle's politics. And their argu-
ments against Kant and divine command theorists are weak and uncon-
vincing. It must be acknowledged that, in the current culture of academic 
specialization, it takes a certain amount of bravery for moral theologians to 
engage directly in professional conversation with moral philosophers. But 
if it is to be done, it should be done well. Hauerwas and Pinches disappoint 
because they do not do it well.38 
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